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ABSTRACT 
 
This exploratory study researches the fit of 6 National Culture (NC) and 6 Corporate Culture (CC) 
parameters in 12 Dutch-German cooperations. 24 firms were asked to verify the nature of their 
cultural fit and relating this perception to the perceived alliance performance. There appeared to 
be a strong (not necessary causal) relationship between the perception of cultural fit and the 
corresponding alliance performance  This finding may have important implications for alliance 
management. Instead of its general preoccupation with strategic and operational fit among alliance 
partners, more attention should be paid to cultural fit. The inclusion of cultural fit indicators in the 








  3 “If there isn't a reasonable cultural fit, I wouldn't touch it. We acquired a small company 
providing telecom services to prisons. We didn't have a thing in common: the wrong 
business, the wrong people. It didn't have a chance.” 





Although the recent wave of newly established strategic alliances might suggest win-win 
situations for all the companies involved in cooperative agreements, mortality rates of cooperative 
agreements have always been extremely high. From an extensive literature review (see Duysters et 
al., 1999) we conclude that the percentage of strategic alliances that fail should be about 
50%-60%, which is a rate between the optimistic and pessimistic conclusions of different authors. 
Reasons for these high failure rates have always remained rather vague. Most authors suggest that 
a mismatch in terms of alliance fit is the most important reason for alliance failure. Fit can arise in 
three main forms: Strategic fit, organizational fit and cultural fit. Most of the attention in the 
literature has been dedicated to strategic and organizational fit of organizations. Cultural fit has 
received far less attention. In order to fill this void we will perform an empirical analysis of 
cultural fit in strategic alliances between Dutch and German companies, as an example how even 
two very related national cultures might create a match or not. 
 
 
WHAT IS CULTURAL FIT IN STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 
Most potential alliance partners tend to pay close attention to strategic and organizational fit 
aspects, but fail to check for cultural aspects on national, corporate, or professional levels (NC, 
CC and PC) (See Ulijn and Weggeman, 2001 for an overview of definitions). It is beyond the 
scope of this paper to discuss all these various aspects of culture in-depth. Therefore we limit our 
attention to two basic levels of culture, i.e. the national and corporate levels of the partners. In 
spite of our focus on these levels we will not fully refrain from paying attention to the professional 
level. Hofstede’s definition of culture (1981, 1992, 2001) being the mental programming of one 
group towards another and his 3 levels of uniqueness which relate personality and human nature 




  4 alliance is an encounter between partners which might differ on all those three levels. This paper 
addresses the issue of culture in SA formation and management. Si & Bruton (1999) have shown 
that most knowledge acquisition goals in international joint ventures for Chinese partners could be 
associated with: learning new technologies and from the partner firm's NC, managerial and 
negotiation styles. For the Western partners learning about government behavior, economic policy 
and law, market characteristics and labor resources are considered to be interesting, but not as 
important as learning to know the management and negotiation styles of the other partner. Culture 
should therefore not be considered as a handicap, but as a source of constructive curiosity! An 
extreme form of tightness in SA formation between the partners is an acquisition for which 
Vermeulen & Barkema (2001) found that cultural distance would have an effect of a 0.52 negative 
correlation using the logic model. The more distant the (national) cultures, the less likelihood of 
subsequent expansions of the firm in that country. Their Euclidean index of cultural distance uses 
the 4 Hofstedian dimensions and copes this way with the misunderstanding that cultural distant 
would mean geographical distant. The Dutch NC, for instance is more similar to that of Finland 
and the one of Germany and the Belgian NC more so with respect to Italy than to the Dutch, 
whereas the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium are neighboring countries in North-West Europe. 
So cultural distance does not equal to geographical distance per se. How tight the fit between the 
partners should be, basically depends not only on cultural distance, but also on the intensity of the 
alliance. An acquisition of one firm by another, for instance, implies a much tighter cultural fit 
between the partners than a merger, a joint venture or a loose SA in this order of decreasing 
tightness needed. In an earlier study of Barkema with Vermeulen (1997) both used the same 
Euclidean index of cultural distance to measure the detrimental effect on international joint 
ventures. They would imply a middle position on the alliance intensity scale between the loose 
character of an SA and the tightness of a full acquisition. So apart from the psychic distance of 
geographical remoteness, alliance intensity has important implications for the nature of cultural fit 
and the acculturation needed as well, as Grotenhuis’s (2001) study comparing technology 
acquisitions by a Dutch firm of US and Japanese firms has shown and can be drawn from the 
above Barkema et al. studies. The present study deals only with a less intense (loose) way of SA 
formation between Dutch and German firms. General speaking the following seems to hold: the 
farther away, the more difficult, but what is near (in our case Germany and the Netherlands) is 





  5 Fig. 1 visualizes Triandis' (1995) concept of loose and tight as what can be expected from a 
potential SA partner, given the NC and CC of another partner. Loose corresponds with a high 
degree of individualism (the US, for instance) and tight is essentially associated with high 
collectivism (Japan, for instance) (see also Triandis, 1995b). Following Grotenhuis’ (2001) 
extensive discussion of recent empirical studies on the matter, we argue that fit is a matter of 
compatibility, complementarity and harmony implying both common, similar and completely 
different cultural elements that are needed to empower each other. 
 
Insert Fig. 1 about here 
 
Let us take the example of Philips, headquartered in the Netherlands. If they were to select a US 
SA partner, the relationship can be very loose, there is no direct confrontation between the NC of 
the US. The focus of the cultural fit could well be on CC harmonization. In North-West Europe, 
the home base of Philips, NC would overlap a little with CC in this harmonization, which would 
grow as a part of the NCs themselves in the Latin world (South Europe and America): the 
tightness increases. In Oriental countries, there would be almost a one to one correspondence to 
NC and CC, Philips would have to become a complete Japanese company (see for a more 
elaborate discussion on this Ulijn and Kumar, 2000). Some first evidence for the plausibility of 
this loose/tight distinction in the cultural fit between SA partners can be found in Hall (1993 and 
1995) for both the US and Japan. On the basis of her analysis of some NCs (US, UK, West 
Germany, France, Italy, South Korea and Japan) within several MNCs as they are viewed by their 
SA partners, Hall concludes that SA partners can use a perception of a cultural distance as a 
'compass' to find the right SA partner. This compass should not use the geographical parameters of 
psychic distance, but cultural distance between neighboring countries as well: what looks alike 
can be very different. Fit, moreover, might not only mean alike, similar, but also compatible, 
complementary. What does it mean for 2 countries which have such a strong trade tradition with 
each other, such as the Netherlands and Germany, being both (Anglo-)Germanic cultures? 
 
POTENTIAL NATIONAL CULTURE (NCs) AND CORPORATE CULTURE (CCs) 
DIFFERENCES AFFECTING FIT IN DUTCH-GERMAN VENTURES 
National culture can be studied from many different perspectives. We studied 6 important 




  6 employees about their attitudes about different aspects of culture (see Tab. 1). Five of them were 
the ones by Hofstede including a Long Term Orientation (LTO)-dimension which he added with 
his colleague Michael Bond on the basis of student answers in the Far East. We also added the 
dimension of Innovation Drive Index (IDI) proposed by Ulijn and Weggeman (2001) to facilitate 
the right mix, the Professional Cultures (PCs) of engineering and marketing in innovation. 
Estimates for comparable Hofstede figures are based upon the studies by Ulijn and Weggeman 
and Bratatjandra (1999) for NL and for both NL and Germany on the basis of a comparison of 
market and technological orientation of 12 Dutch and German comparable firms (Ulijn, Nagel & 
Tan, 2001). 
 
Insert Tab. 1 about here 
 
Power distance (PDI): The PDI measures the expectation and the acceptance of unequal 
distribution of power. Both the Netherlands and Germany have a low PDI value. This indicates 
that our respondents tend to minimize inequality. Individualism (IDV): The Netherlands belongs 
to the most individualistic societies. The ties between individuals are loose. Also Germany seems 
to be rather  individualistic. By contrast in collective societies, people are integrated into strong, 
cohesive in-groups for most their lives (for instance Japan). Masculinity (MAS): While the scores 
for PDI and IDV are quite identical, the MAS is much higher for Germany than for the 
Netherlands. The 'masculine' end of this scale describes the dominating role of  achievement and 
success in a society. For the opposite 'feminine' end the dominant values in a society are 
associated with caring for others and quality of life. Uncertainty avoidance (UAI): Germans tend 
to avoid uncertainty to a larger degree than their Dutch neighbors. A high UAI reflects feelings of 
threat in uncertain or unknown situations. Long-term orientation (LTO): LTO is the extent to 
which a society exhibits a pragmatic future-orientated perspective rather than a conventional 
historic or short-term point of view. The Dutch are expected to pursue a long-term orientation. A 
high score on uncertainty avoidance might imply a low risk approach to SAs, a high power 
distance of one of the partners might be obstructive to a natural development of the venture. The 
same applies for a high level of individualism. On those particular scores Dutch and German 
partners are not too far apart. The slightly higher LTO of the Dutch partner (44 vs. 31) might help 
a long term orientation in strategic alliancing. What about the Innovation Drive of both partners? 




  7 development from the 'technological point of view' vs. a rather market-oriented approach using 
both engineering and marketing PCs. A low score for innovation would be expected for a market 
pull policy. An innovation friendly organization tends to be associated with a more technology 
push business oriented policy. Ulijn, Nagel & Tan (2001, 21) found that German engineers are 
less market oriented than their Dutch counterparts. The strong feminine values of Dutch firms in 
terms of their national and corporate culture (NC and CC) might lead to a more customer 
orientated focus (Market Pull) compared to the more masculine German firms. However, both 
samples showed a tendency to go from a technological to a market orientation, but Dutch firms 
were quicker to do this than German ones. In a SA Dutch and German partners could be 
complementary to each other. It is clear that some of those dimensions might overlap with those of 
NCs, but it is beyond the scope of this paper to do some cross-validation. Obviously there is an 
interaction between NC and CC as Hofstede indicated (1991 and 2001) by using the PDI and UAI 
to characterize a German, British or French firm. 
 
Measuring cultural fit between firms from different NCs is further complicated with the CC of 
those firms. As a matter fact any SA, joint venture, merger or acquisition deals with this first, 
often called the 'chemistry' of two firms being compatible or not. Weber's (2000) study is an 
example of such a measurement of fit between 73 firms involved in mergers and acquisition 
within one nation, that of the US. It uses 7 dimensions which partly overlap with the 6 CC 
dimensions by Hofstede et al. (1990) which we prefer here to make them fit better our NC 
dimensions and SAs and also because they are less top management team oriented than what 
Weber suggests. Comparable are: Performance orientation (results oriented), Integration vs. lateral 
interdependence (tight vs. loose), Innovation and action orientation (job oriented), and Top 
management contact (employee oriented) as Weber defines those concepts. Reward orientation is 
an aspect of HRM which is less relevant to SAs, risk taking relates to our NC dimension UAI, and 
autonomy and decision making to our NC dimension PDI. This study applies 6 different NC and 
CC specific dimensions to make a complete separate check. The habit of human beings is not only 
influenced by its nation of origin, but also by the organizations with which they have a 
relationship. The concept of corporate culture (CC) describes the value and norm system and 
shared models of thinking and behaving which influence decisions and behavior of the employees 
in the company. Corporate culture is the way the employee in the company thinks, talks and works 




  8  
Tab. 1 shows the predictions for the 6 CC dimensions for the Netherlands and Germany. 
Organization bound vs. professional: This is obvious when people feel the organizational norms 
cover their behavior at home as at work. Employees on a professional level separate their private 
from their working live. Hofstede et al. (1990) use the term parochial, but we would prefer the 
label organization bound (as an element of rather CC) here as opposed to Professional Culture 
(PC). Ulijn & Weggeman show that the professional values are more frequent in German speaking 
countries. The Netherlands are expected to be more organization bounded. Process oriented vs. 
results oriented: This dimension confronts a process oriented orientation with a results orientation. 
In a process oriented culture, employees tend to avoid uncertainty. In a results oriented culture, on 
the other hand, people are used to situations where uncertainty occurs and they view this as a 
challenge. We expect the German companies to be more process oriented than the Dutch. This is 
caused by the higher score for UAI and a more technological orientation of the German 
employees. Employee oriented vs. job oriented: A concern for employees (employee oriented, 
consideration of the employees' feelings, thoughts and problems) is compared with a concern for 
completing the work (job oriented, strong pressure for employees to complete their job). The 
Dutch are supposed to be more employee oriented. Because of their affiliation to a society with a 
low score on masculinity. Open system vs. closed system: An open systems company welcomes 
beginners. Almost everybody would fit. In a closed system only very special people fit into the 
organization and new employees need a long time to accommodate. Because of the higher scores 
in MAS and UAI German companies are expected to be less open to beginners and outsiders. 
Loose control vs. tight control: The control dimension refers to the degree of internal structuring 
in the organization. In units with loose control hardly anybody thinks of costs and to be punctual 
is not a virtue. In a tight control unit, employees emphasize cost-consciousness first and 
everybody has a strong sense for punctuality. In Dutch companies we expect a more loose control 
than in the German firms (Ulijn & Weggeman, 2001). Such firms belong to the Anglo-Nordic 
culture which is supposed to be more open. Additionally, a loose controlled organization leaves 
more space for individualism. Normative vs. pragmatic: This dimension considers the popular 
notion of customer orientation. A normative organization emphasizes organizational procedures. 
Pragmatic in this case means market-driven. Customer satisfaction is more important than the 
procedure to reach this goal. The more open, loosed controlled society of the Netherlands should 




  9 dimensions might affect an alliance performance more specifically, such as a high process, 
employee and professional orientation, an open system approach and a tight control (as a sign of 
commitment) to give way to a natural SA development. A strong focus on (short term) results, an 
attachment to one's own job and organization in a closed, normative system with a loose control 
might lead to an early failure. An increasing number of intercultural management studies take the 
professional level of culture into consideration: PC (see Ulijn et al. and Ulijn & Weggeman, both 
2001). Many employees don't feel loyal to the company any more but to their professional code of 
ethics (Wever, 1990). This study is limited to NC and CC levels, but as an intermediate we have 
added Innovation Drive as interaction between the PC of marketers and engineers and the 
organization bound/professional distinction between NC and CC, assuming that those are the 
predominant predictors of cultural fit as representatives of the selected Dutch and German samples 
perceive it. 
 
THE MUTUAL CULTURAL PERCEPTION FIT OF 6 DUTCH -GERMAN and 6 
GERMAN-DUTCH SAs  
How does one examine cultural fit? Cultural studies range from mere introspection or self 
perception studies (such as the ones of Hofstede and his "school" and Weber, 2000) and 
participant-observer studies of a more anthropological nature (Hall and Hall, 1990, for instance, 
including German culture). Perception studies are very rare: Hall (1995), Limaye (2000) and Ulijn 
& St. Amant (2000) are examples. In the context of SA formation Steensma et al. (2000) study the 
perception of technological uncertainty, an important aspect of risk taking and uncertainty 
avoidance. Technological fit between technology-driven SA partners is another sometimes 
overlooked feature of alliance performance, next to strategy, organization, operation and culture: 
the top managers make the decisions and the engineers have to follow. They roughly found that 
collective/masculine cultures, such as SMEs in India and Mexico considered themselves as more 
dependent on technological resources (high technological uncertainty) than individual/feminine 
ones, such as SMEs in Norway and Sweden. This seems to coincide also with a difference in 
technological and innovative development, and the good news is that both India and Mexico seem 
to use their high UAI as an incentive to engage in technology alliances to reduce that perceived 
technological uncertainty. Both Limaye and Ulijn & St. Amant review the perception literature 
from an intercultural perspective: What you see, might not be what it is, thus the mutual 




  10 of the outcomes considerably. According to the classification above, our work is a mutual 
perception study. On the one hand, a Dutch team administered a questionnaire on 6 Dutch 
organizations, which are (or were) involved in a strategic alliance with a German organization  - 
on the other hand, a German team did the same with 6 German managers, involved in strategic 
alliancing with Dutch. In both parts of the study, we asked the participants to rank their own NC 
and CC, as well as the cultural dimensions of their counterparts. Although it was impossible for 
practical reasons to ask both counterparts of one SA, we got an impression of how the Germans 
and the Dutch see each other. Therefore, we checked the mutual perception. Both research teams 
worked with nearly the same questionnaire. The main part in both questionnaires concerns NC and 
CC on the one hand and the alliance performance on the other hand. The relationship between 
cultural fit and the performance of the cooperation has been indicated by several authors (see 
Bronder, 1993, for instance), but has not been really verified yet in SAs. From the business side 
companies such as Roland Berger and KPMG which are well experienced in supporting 
international SAs tend to risk bad performance, also due to cultural aspects. This study tries to 
verify the following hypothesis to substantiate this aspect in some detail: 
 
Hypothesis: There is a positive relationship between the perceived cultural fit 
between SA partners of The Netherlands and Germany and the global appraisal of 
their alliance performance. 
 
THE EXPLORATORY STUDY INTO THE NC AND CC PARAMETERS AND THEIR 
PERCEPTION OF FIT 
 
Method 
Cultural factors can be examined in many different ways. Hendriks distinguishes between the 
historical, the survey, the experimental and the ‘real life’ tradition (Hendriks, 1991, 169-186). 
According to this classification, this study reflects a survey tradition using a questionnaire among 
Dutch and German managers who are (were) involved in mutual SAs. Moreover the multiple case 
study method (Yin, 1993) was used so that the Dutch and German case could replicate each other 
within the same study. Important is then to select comparable SA samples. 
 




  11 alliances. All in all 12 companies which are involved in a strategic alliance filled out a 
questionnaire regarding this cooperation. The 12 companies are characterized in Tab. 2.  
 
Insert Tab. 2 about here 
 
At the left hand-side we described one specific partner we asked and on the right hand-side its 
strategic counterpart. As Tab. 2 shows, the size of the firms and the branches vary. If an 
organization is alliance-experienced or alliance-inexperienced depends on the number of alliances, 
a firm is (or was) involved in, during the last years. We refer to Draulans, de Man and Volberda 
which estimate a turning point at around six alliances (see Draulans et al., 2003). Since no 
organization of our sample is (or was) involved in more than 6 strategic alliances during the last 5 
years1, all are alliance-inexperienced. This beginning alliance experience might predict poor 
performance as well, a situation which might be more sensitive to cultural fit than if SA partners 
have a large intercultural experience. Hence this factor cannot be a source of variation in our 
sample. The information about the respective German or Dutch counterpart was gathered by 
asking our primary contacts of the responsible SA teams. The sectors of SAs were the same for 
both partners: Logistics in 6 cases, construction in 2, chemistry, market research, retail and steel in 
one each. This seems to be not too unrepresentative for the Dutch-German trade relations, given 
the predominant position of The Netherlands as a distribution country within North-Western 
Europe. 25% of all trucks on the European roads originates from this country also for transports to 
and through Germany.  
 
Questionnaire and statistics used: As mentioned above both teams worked with a comparable 
questionnaire, only some details were changed. It is based on a tool developed originally by 
Draulans et al. (2003). The questionnaire consists of several parts. At the beginning there were 
general questions about the company demographics. The data is already shown in Tab. 2. The next 
part concerned with the type of alliance. In this part we wanted to know how long the cooperation 
exists and in which field the organizations work together. Moreover, the intention and outcome of 
the alliance were researched. At this point the respondents had to classify their goals and were 
asked to rate the outcomes. Finally, they had to give a judgement about the whole performance, 
about the global appraisal of the cooperation. Our focus is on the so called cultural section. In this 
                                                           




  12 part there were some single items about the corporate culture at the beginning, but the main part of 
this section dealt with the cultural dimensions of Hofstede, the way Fig. 2 shows for a sample 
item, that of UAI. 
 
Insert Fig. 2 about here 
 
Every respondent had to rank both counterparts of the alliance. In the example above, the 
respondent avoided uncertainty to a very high degree. Its partner was perceived as scoring lower 
on  this dimension. Finally, the respondents were asked to list positive and negative aspects of the 
cooperation in an open slot.  At the end of the questionnaire we gathered some personal data of the 
respondent. Testing the relationship between cultural fit and performance on a statistical level 
could be done by calculating Pearson’s r. This statistical index helps us to define the degree on 
how the dependent variable reacts to the independent. It shows us the strength of the relationship 
between cultural fit and alliance performance.  
 
Results 
The first step to approach cultural fit within the SA is to scrutinize the differences regarding single 
NC and CC dimensions. Tab. 3 shows the differences between the 2 partners perceived by the 
respondents. They ranked their and their partners’ NC and CC dimensions scores on a 5 point 
scale ranging from 0 to 4 (no, small, fair, rather big, big).  
 
Insert Tab. 3 about here 
 
In general both, Dutch and German respondents, perceived small differences regarding NC and 
CC. Above all, the Germans reported about equal cultures. Only 1 company sees a difference 
bigger than 2 units (GD sample, SA 6, Innovation drive). Regarding 7 out of 12 dimensions most 
respondents see no difference (0) between their partner and themselves. Although in the DG 
sample more managers notice a difference of 2 units (particularly “open-closed system”), only 2 
(SA2, SA5) see major differences (more than 2 units) between the partners regarding 1 dimension. 
Concerning power distance the GD sample shows no differences, while the Dutch perceive a gap 
(SA5). On the other hand the samples differ only slightly in terms of masculinity. The partners 




  13 the Anglo-Germanic culture of both countries. The culture within the organization (CC) seems to 
be more powerful than NC. Tab. 4 tries to link the perceived cultural difference with the global 
appraisal of the alliance performance and therefore sets the scene for testing the main hypothesis.  
 
Insert Tab. 4 about here 
 
Tab. 3 showed the cultural differences between the allies, the means of which are visible in Tab. 4. 
The inverse of the means is calculated in the third column. It is used to describe the cultural fit. 
Hence, a high score on this represents a good cultural fit of both partners. Furthermore, all 
respondents were asked to rate the performance of the cooperation. The global appraisal is the 
result of this rating, whereas 5 means a very good performance and 1 a bad cooperation. In order 
to compare the global appraisal with the cultural fit it is important to divide both entities by their 
means. The result of this standardization is presented in the last 2 columns. Concerning our main 
hypothesis we expect a positive relationship between  performance and cultural fit. We will 
illustrate this relationship below, but first have another look on Tab. 4. A comparison of  both 
samples reveals that there are some conspicuous aspects: All in all, German managers perceive 
less cultural differences (mean 0,63) than the managers interviewed by the Dutch (mean 1,01). 
Furthermore, the Germans are more satisfied with the global appraisal than the Dutch (mean 4 vs. 
mean 3,25). Respondent GD2 did not find any cultural differences between his own and the 
partner organization. Therefore it is impossible to calculate its cultural fit. Nevertheless, 
organization GD2 gives us a first prediction on the relationship between cultural fit and alliance 
performance. Concerning the cultural aspects both partners are fitting well, and respondent GD2 
rated the global appraisal as high as possible. Fig. 3 presents the relationship implied by our 
hypothesis. 
 
Insert Fig. 3 about here 
 
The x-axis describes the indexed cultural fit, the y-axis describes the indexed global appraisal of the 
alliance performance. The scores differ slightly from the scores in Tab. 4, since we took both 
perceptions into consideration by calculating the indexes. The grey symbols illustrate the German 
sample. The black symbols point to the Dutch alliances. GD2 is missing since it has no cultural fit 




  14 about the alliance performance. As mentioned above we used Person’s r to test different relationships. 
It demonstrates the relationship between the dependent variable y and the independent variable x. N 
means the size of the sample. Tab. 5 shows the results of this calculation. 
 
Insert Tab. 5 about here 
 
The highest possible score for r would be 1. The higher Pearson’s r the stronger is the relationship. 
Therefore, it seems as there is a stronger relationship within the Dutch sample. But, there is one 
organisation missing within the German sample. Considering this, Pearson’s r for the German group 
would raise. Nevertheless, regarding both perceptions combined, we found definitely a relationship 
between the cultural fit and the performance. Hence, our hypothesis is confirmed. There is a possible 
relationship between the global appraisal of alliance performance and the perceived cultural fit 
between yourself as being responsible for the SA and the other involved in this Dutch-German SA 
sample.  
 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR SA-PRACTICE AND RESEARCH 
The most important result of our study is concerned with the influence of cultural fit on the 
outcome of strategic alliances, which seems to be affected negatively when there are big 
differences in national and corporate culture. Not only "hard facts" such as market share or the 
annual turnover should therefore be considered in partner selection processes, but also "soft facts" 
such as cultural elements. SA intermediates and partners could be trained to act upon this 
effectively to avoid failures because of cultural misfit in both directions: SAs initiated by Dutch 
(DG) and German firms (GD) towards each other’s respective partners. There are several alliance 
tools which can be used to enhance alliance performance (Remer and Schaetzlein, 2002). 
Normally all SAs have a manager who is responsible directly for the alliance with an external 
specialist to accompany the process and care for potential and actual conflicts between both 
partners. Also mutual responsibilities and terms, like win and loss share should be fixed a priori. 
For documentation information tools, such as support decision systems or checklists are often 
used. What can alliance managers do apart from using the tools above? Alliance managers might 
benchmark cultures of possible partners and  perform cultural audits. Geonexus Communications 
(1994) quoted by Funakawa (1997) presents a useful framework to make such a culture bridge 




  15 solidly fixed in the common ground of human nature. Needless to say that the mutual perception 
of each other's strongholds of language and behavior/style at either side of the bridge above the 
water level and the customs, frame of reference, assumed rules, beliefs and values under it would 
be a key analysis to make any cultural fit work between the partners. 
 
The current study is limited in different ways. First, since there is a variation of industrial sectors 
(see Tab. 2) within the sample, it would be very interesting to test, if the cultural influence varies 
across the different branches. Second, the sample had an overall beginning alliance experience. 
Further studies should also consider experienced SA partners to analyze the influence of routine 
on the global appraisal of the alliance performance. Moreover, our study is limited to NC and CC 
levels. To make the bridge to PC Innovation Drive was added as the interaction between the PC of 
marketers and engineers for NC and the organization bound/professional distinction for CC, 
assuming that NC and CC differences are the predominant predictors of cultural fit in the selected 
Dutch and German samples. We presupposed that almost the same PC is shared by the 
representatives of the SAs surveyed to isolate NC and CC as the determining variable in this study 
properly, but a future study should include PC, because it could address the technological and 
market fit between Dutch and German partners better. The present study suggests as well that in 
particular the NC dimensions of collectivism and long term orientation could foster cooperation 
and long term success in SAs. Specific CC parameters as pragmatism, professionalism and tight 
control can also be used as complementary measures. A future study could replicate the one by 
Nakata and Sivakumar (1996) for new product development for all NC dimensions including a 
new one Innovation Drive for the different stages of SA formation. The methodology used by 
Hofstede would increase in reliability and validity, if some recent insights from cultural 
psychology, in particular related to the dimension of collectivism, would be followed up (Miller, 
2002 and Oyserman et al. 2002). A last study could be performed combining self perception 
through introspection and the mutual perception method used here to come to a complete mirror 
effect. Do not show the mirror to the SA partner only, but look also yourself in it! A 15 years’ 
negotiation training experience by one of the authors (Ulijn) indicates that in doing so 
counterparts get a better insight into the cultural and personal aspects of their behavior to avoid 
unintended misunderstandings in the relation development. Ulijn (in prep.) offers a methodology 
to combine the perceptions of yourself (Geert Hofstede’s introspection) and how you are 




  16 about conflict management styles in an ICT alliance network of banks in 7 different European 
countries, not only The Netherlands and Germany, but also Finland, Austria, Belgium, France and 
Italy. The present study showed clearly that mutual perception is an important part of assessing 
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  23  TABLE 1 
Differences between Dutch and German NCs and CC`s 
(based upon Hofstede, 2001 and Ulijn and Weggeman, 2001) 
 




38   35  
Individualism 
(IDV) 
80   67 
Masculinity 
(MAS) 




















open system  closed system 
loose control  tight control 
 
pragmatic normative 









  24 TABLE 2 
The Dutch and German samples 
 
Partner 1  Partner 2 









DG1*  Construction 500+  --  Construction 500+  -- 
DG2  Construction 500+  --  Construction 250-500  No 
DG3  Logistics 20-50  No  Logistics 250-500  -- 
DG4  Logistics  20-50  No  Logistics  20-50  No 
DG5  Steel   1-20  No  Steel   50-250  No 
DG6  Logistics  50-250  No  Logistics  50-250  No 
GD1**  Market research 20-50 No  Market research 50-250 No 
GD2  Logistics 250-500  -- Logistics  50-250  -- 
GD3  Chemistry 50-250  No  Chemistry  1-20  No 
GD4  Logistics  500+ No  Logistics  50-250  No 
GD5  Retail 1-20  No  Retail  20-50  -- 
GD6  Logistics  250-500 -- Logistics  500+  -- 
* DG = The responsible SA team is Dutch 




  25 TABLE 3 
Verification of NC and CC Differences in both Samples 
Dutch-German sample (DG) 
Absolute differences between partners 
German-Dutch sample (GD) 
Absolute differences between partners 
NC Dimensions 
0  1  2  3  4  0  1  2  3  4 
Power distance   1,2,3  4,6  5    1,2,3,4,5,6        
Individualism  3 1,4,6  2,5     2,4  1,3,5,6       
Masculinity  1,3,5,6 2,4      1,2,3,4,6  5       
Uncertainty avoidance  2,4,5 1,3,6       2,4  3,5 1,6    
Long term orientation  4 1,2,3,6 5     2,3,4,5 1,6     
Innovation drive  1,3,4 6  2,5     2,4  1  3,5  6   
CC Dimensions  0  1  2  3  4  0  1  2  3  4 
Organization bounded – 
professional 
1,5,6 3  4  2   2,3,6  1  4,5     
Process – result oriented  1 3,4,5,6      2  2,3,4,6 1,5     
Employee – job oriented  1,2 3,4,5,6       2,4  3,6 1,5    
Open – closed system  4 1  2,3,5,6      2,4,5  1,3  6     
Loose – tight control  5 1,6  2,3,4      2,3,6  1,4,5       
Pragmatic - normative  4,5 1,3,6  2     1,2,5  3,4 6   
The horizontal numbers refer to a scale of increasing difference perceived between the partners, 






  26 TABLE 4  
The Perception of Cultural Fit related to Global Appraisal of Alliance Performance in both 
samples 








DG1  0,58  1,72  3,5  1,58  1,08 
DG2  1,67  0,60  2  0,55  0,62 
DG3  0,91  1,10  3  1,01  0,92 
DG4  0,83  1,20  5  1,10  1,54 
DG5  1,08  0,93  2,5  0,85  0,77 
DG6  1,00  1,00  3,5  0,92  1,08 
Mean DG  1,01  1,09  3,25  1  1 
GD1  0,92  1,09  3  0,69  0,75 
GD2  0,00  impossible  5  --  1,25 
GD3  0,58  1,72  4  1,08  1,00 
GD4  0,33  3,03  4  1,91  1,00 
GD5  0,92  1,09  5  0,69  1,25 
GD6  1,00  1,00  3  0,63  0,75 
Mean GD  0,63  1,59  4  1  1 
Total Mean  0,82  1,32  3,63  1  1 
*12 is the maximum of cultural fit 




  27 TABLE 5 
Statistical Verification of the Relation between the Perception of Cultural Fit and the Alliance 
Performance  
 
Perception  N  xi  yi  Pearson’s r 
Dutch and German 
perception combined  11  Cultural differences of all 
12 dimensions 
Indexed global 
appraisal  0,38 
Dutch perception (DG) 6  Cultural differences of all 
12 dimensions 
Indexed global 
appraisal  0,55 
German perception 
(GD)  5  Cultural differences of all 
12 dimensions 
Indexed global 
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  29 FIGURE 2 
Sample Item to assess the Perception of Self and Other in SA 












    1: high items apply totally   
Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI) 
 
The extend to which people feel threatened by uncertainty and ambiguity and try to avoid these situations.  
 
High:  Anxiety, higher stress      Low:  Relaxed, lower stress 
  Inner urge to work hard        Hard work not a virtue per se 
  Showing emotions accepted      Emotions not shown 
  Conflict is threatening        Conflict and competition seen as fair play 
 Need  for  consensus     Acceptance  of  dissent 
  Need to avoid failure        Willingness to take risks 
  Need for law and rules        There should be a few rules 
 
Own organisation 
High  1 2 3 4 5  Low
 
Partner organisation 
High  1 2 3 4 5  Low
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Low Cultural  Fit  High 
   
DG: The responsible SA team is Dutch 
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